Challenges the claim that intuitions about genuine disagreement show anything about sameness of meanings of terms or sameness of concepts involved.

On Bloggingheads.tv, Mark Schroeder (USC) and Will Wilkinson talk about Schroeder's book "Slaves of the Passions" which defends a version of the Humean Theory of Reasons

I'll throw one of my own posts into the mix. Here's an argument from some intuitively plausible principles about emotions against a kind of moral skepticism. Not sure what I think about the argument yet, but it seemed worth thinking about.

More about a puzzle about 'ought'.

It is often said that ‘ought’ is ambiguous in the following kind of way. When one utters ‘A ought to \phi,’ one might mean that A morally ought to \phi, or that A prudentially ought to \phi, or A ‘chessly’ ought to \phi etc