Clayton Littlejohn asks this question.

Jonathan Schaffer started getting into the X-phi game a while back. Here is a follow up. He has a draft of a paper that he posted a draft of, and he's looking for feedback.

It turns out there is no statistically significant difference between ethicists, other philosophers, or non-philosophers in their responsiveness to students. This is taken as one method to see whether ethicists are any more ethical than other academics.

John Doris' reply to all commenters...

Nice post by Ichikawa raising some concerns about Weinberg's "How To Challenge Intuitions" paper.

Jonathan Schaffer gives some experimental support to contrastivism.

Eric Schwitzgebel (UCR) and Fiery Cushman (Harvard) are conducting a moral sense test to test moral intuitions about hypothetical scenarios. It looks like they're looking for people with philosophy degrees (i.e., the sympoze user demographic)

A contribution from the recent workshop on Experimental Philosophy in Cologne. Thomas Grundmann defends intuition-based philosophy against Weinberg's charge of "hopelessness".

From the post: Steve Campbell from Michigan kindly directed my attention to a new paper that uses the methods of experimental philosophy to investigate the objectivity question in metaethics. This paper by Geoffrey Goodwin and John Darley is entitled 'The Psychology of Metaethics: Exploring Objectivism' (downloadable from HERE). I have a couple of questions below but I think I need to say little first about the paper.

Eric from the Splintered Mind with an explanation of what he takes the consequences of experimental philosophy to be for the rest of philosophy. Also, read the comments.